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Summary
The article discusses several epistemological and
methodological issues related to the analysis of dis-
course in general and of educational talk in particular.
The theoretical framework provided by conversation
analysis (CA) is applied and critically discussed in
the analysis of an empirical example of educational
talk. Several questions seem pertinent: Can we – as
analysts – have direct access to talk “as it actually oc-
curs”, independent of any kind of theorizing and pre-
defined categorization? What is the epistemological
status of the conversation analytic categories? What
are the limitations of applying turn-taking as an ana-
lytical category in the study of talk? To what extent
can we presume the knowledgeability of the inter-
locutors as a premise in our analysis? On the back-
ground of my own attempts at applying CA in the
analysis of educational discourse, I argue for a widen-
ing of the perspective from a narrow, empiricist focus
on conversational turn-takings and sequential organi-
zation of talk, for example in the handling of issues
like silences and absences in talk. On the other hand, I
also warn against the pitfalls of historicist, abstract
social theory; here exemplified with some texts from
theorists applying abstract philosophical categories
from dialectical and historical materialism like “the
law of contradiction” as explanatory tools in the
study of situated action. In the study of educational
meaning making we should avoid empiricist as well
as historicist approaches and explanations.
Introduction
In this theoretical paper I discuss some epis-
temological and methodological issues relat-
ed to the analysis of discourse in general and
of educational talk in particular. My discus-
sion connects to recent debates in the journal
Discourse and Society (Schegloff, 1997,
1998; Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1998) and ac-
tivity theory (Engestrom, 1999, which is a di-
rect response to the discussion in Discourse
and Society) where the research status and
relevance of conversation analysis (CA) has
been the focus of discussion. In this article I
want to address some fundamental epistemo-
logical questions in the study of talk as social
action in general and educational talk and
meaning making processes in particular: Can
we – as analysts – have direct access to talk
“as it actually occurs”, independent of any
kind of theorizing and predefined categoriza-
tion? What is the epistemological status of
the conversation analytic categories? What
are the limitations of applying turn taking as
an analytical category in the study of talk? To
what extent can we presume the knowledge-
ability of the interlocutors as a premise in our
analysis? 
My own approach can probably best be la-
beled discourse analytic, inspired by the later
philosophy of Wittgenstein, by discursive
and rhetorical psychology (e.g., Edwards,
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1997; Harré and Gillet, 1994; Billig 1996)
and also by ethnomethodology (Garfinkel.
1967; Lynch, 1992). Although my approach
is inspired by ethnometodology and conver-
sation analysis, I think it is also important to
recognize the limitations and what I consider
empiricist tendencies in conversation analy-
sis. On the background of my own attempts
to try to apply CA on educational discourse, I
will argue for a widening of the perspective
from a narrow focus on conversational turn-
takings and sequential organization of talk.
On the other hand, I am also critical against
the pitfalls of historicist, abstract social theo-
ry, here exemplified with some texts from ac-
tivity theorists applying abstract philosophi-
cal categories from dialectical materialism
like “the law of contradiction” as explanatory
tools in the study of situated action. In the
study of educational meaning making we
need to avoid empiricist as well as abstract,
historicist approaches and modes of explana-
tions.
The focus of the paper is primarily on
epistemological and general theoretical is-
sues, but some methodological implications
are also briefly discussed as examples and il-




My basic theoretical and methodological ap-
proach is aligned with the ethnomethodolog-
ical program, attempting to reconstruct order
through the ways in which people themselves
make this order available to each other. Any
setting organizes its environment of practical
activities to make it 
“detectable, countable, recordable, reportable,
tell-a-story-aboutable, analysable – in short, ac-
countable” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33, emphasis in
the original). 
The impact of this programme has been
broad in the social sciences. See for example
how Bruno Latour recently explained the ba-
sic idea of actor-network theory: 
“For us ANT (that is: Actor Network Theory) was
simply another way of being faithful to the in-
sights of ethnomethodology: actors know what
they do and we have to learn from them not only
what they do, but how and why they do it. It is us,
the social scientists, who lack knowledge of what
they do, and not they who are missing the expla-
nation of why they are unwittingly manipulated
by forces exterior to themselves and known to the
social scientist’s powerful gaze and methods.”
(Latour, 1999, p. 19)
Harold Garfinkel once formulated his funda-
mental conception of the study of social ac-
tion in contrast to that of Durkheim:
“Thereby, in contrast to certain versions of
Durkheim that teach that the objective reality of
social fact is sociology’s fundamental principle,
the lesson is taken instead and used as a study
policy, that the objective reality of social facts as
an ongoing accomplishment of the concerted ac-
tivities of daily life, with the ordinary artful ways
of that accomplishment being by members
known, used and taken for granted, is for mem-
bers doing sociology, a fundamental phenome-
non.” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii) 
In contrast to Durkheim, Garfinkel argues in
a radical way that instead of departing from a
strong essentialist view taking “the objective
reality” for granted, social scientists should
rather focus on how this “objective reality” is
locally produced, as an ongoing accomplish-
ment of and in participants’ daily life and ac-
tivities. This is an epistemological argument,
not an ontological one. Garfinkel is not in the
postmodernist, relativist business of denying
the existence of an objective world. On the
contrary, he would argue that in order to be
able to get a more realistic view of the world,
the social scientist cannot take this world for
granted but show how it is understood and
produced through the participants’ own prac-
tices and daily life.
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Ethnomethodological researchers have pi-
oneered the use of audiotape and videotape
of social interaction – which has now become
standard across qualitative and interpretive
sociology and education. Several advantages
of data in this form should be noticed: “1.
They enable the analyst to attend to the fine
detail of talk and interaction, and 2. Through
their reproducibility, they enable the ana-
lyst’s observations to be assessed in relation
to the very data which those findings refer
to.” (Hester and Francis, 2000, p. 4) An even
more important corollary of the ethno-
methodological commitment to the study of
local order should be mentioned. The focus
on local order implies that the studies them-
selves “are shaped by the distinctive and spe-
cific character of the phenomenon they in-
vestigate” (ibid., p. 4). Studies of this kind
will hence necessarily be diverse in style and
methodological approach. Therefore, eth-
nomethodology does not provide one parti-
cular “method” in their analyses. 
Garfinkel also notices how this objectivity
is “taken for granted” as something which is
“seen, but unnoticed”. This means that the
analyst should also focus not only on what is
explicitly said and noticed, but also on the
tacit, the un-said and what seems absent from
the conversation. This means that an empiri-
cist, narrow focus on studying the sequential
organization of spoken utterances may be in-





The discursive analytic perspective on social
action and learning which constitutes the
general framework for my understanding, fo-
cuses on studying discursive interaction and
cognition in a situated context. Discourse
analysis has become a broad and multifac-
eted research tradition comprising a broad
range of approaches and research strategies.
In Margaret Wetherell’s formulation “the
boundary lines are drawn between styles of
work which affiliate with EM and CA and
analysis which follow post-structuralist or
Foucauldian lines.” (Wetherell, 1998) In this
study I will discuss EM and CA as elements
in a broader discursive analytic approach, al-
beit not the post-structuralist or Foucaldian
versions. Foucauldian studies tend to view
discourses as cultural totalities1, and these
are also the focus of analysis. This method-
ological approach differs substantially from a
view which focuses on examining the ways
in which people use utterances in specific
contexts. As Michael Billig formulates this:
“Foucault’s notion of ‘discourse” is, to use
Saussure’s distinction, more langue than pa-
role – concerned with the hypothetical total
structure rather than particular usage.”
(Billig, 1996) 
Following the ideas of discursive psychol-
ogy (especially as formulated by Edwards,
1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Parker,
1992), language is not analysed as symptoms
of inner processes, and it is assumed that the
traditional topics of psychology (e.g., emo-
tions, memory etc) refer to phenomena which
are outwardly observable. For example, if
one wishes to study how or to what extent
students “learn” in interaction with comput-
ers, the researcher should be paying attention
to what students are actually doing and say-
ing when they use computers in their daily
work.
EM, CA and also important parts of the
broader discourse analytic tradition take in-
spiration from the philosophical tradition of
1 This does not mean that I consider Foucault a less inter-
esting theorist. On the contrary, I regard his ideas of knowl-
edge and power as highly relevant in the study of pedagogy
and institutional knowledge production, My point here is
more related to the methodological focus and the unit of
analysis in the study of educational meaning making and
talk. 
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Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. CA is “fun-
damentally an ethnomethological enter-
prise.” (Potter, 1996) and is to be understood
as EM applied on conversations and espe-
cially “mundane, everyday talk”. Discursive
psychology applies this to psychological
phenomena and argues that phenomena
which traditional psychological theories
have treated as “inner processes”, are, in fact,
constituted through social, discursive activi-
ty. Accordingly, discursive psychology ar-
gues that psychology should be based on the
study of this outward activity rather than hy-
pothetical, and essentially unobservable, in-
ner states. 
As I showed above, Wittgenstein stated in
Philosophical Investigations that, “an ‘inner
process’ stands in need for outward criteria
(1953, remark 580). He claimed that “the
characteristic mark of all ‘feelings” is that
there is expression of them, i.e. facial expres-
sion, gestures”, (1967, remark 513). The im-
plication is profound. Analysts should not
search for the unobservable essences, which
are presumed to lie behind the use of feeling-
words. They should be examining in detail
the ways people make claims about psycho-
logical states and what they are doing when
they make, or dispute, such psychological
claims: they should be asking “what is the
purpose of this language, how is it being
used?” (Wittgenstein, 1967, remark 716)
I shall emphasise three particularly central
points in my conception of discourse analy-
sis: action, rhetoric, and accountability.2
The first point is that cognitive phenome-
na are recast as actions. “Discursive psy-
chology generally is concerned with people’s
practices: communication, interaction, argu-
ment; and the organization of those practices
in different kinds of settings.” (Edwards &
Potter, 1992, p. 156) The concern is with how
people carry out reasoning and problem solv-
ing as part of their practical activities.
Analytically we, as researchers, should be
cautious in applying analytical categories to
do with phenomena such as degrees of shared
knowledge, depth of understanding and im-
pact of technology on discourse, and instead
be sensitive to what social actors actually do
through talk and text.
The second point highlights how dis-
course is always produced from a position,
which is to say that it has a rhetorical organi-
zation. It is people situated in space and time,
with different interests, stakes and concerns,
who produce actions. Actions are therefore
never neutral in any simple sense; they are
produced with specific goals in mind. These,
however, are features of the content and orga-
nization of discourse, not of people’s individ-
ual motivations or thoughts. This means that
people treat each other as competent knowl-
edgeable members with motivations, abili-
ties and interests, and that these concerns are
displayed in their discourse. An important
objective in discourse analysis is to analyse
the organization of these actions, as well as
identify the devices that the participants rely
on to accomplish this in different settings.
The last point concerns accountability,
that is to say, speakers routinely deal with is-
sues of agency and responsibility when giv-
ing accounts or descriptions of events and
other phenomena. How teachers orient to ac-
countability when providing assessments of
students, would be an interesting topic to
pursue further. When students fail to accom-
plish a task, is this attributed to bad teaching
or to the students’ lack of reasoning ability?
These are common concerns in teacher-pupil
interaction. In this regard educational dis-
course is about social relationships, where is-
sues related to students learning and abilities
are practical concerns for the teacher, and do
no refer merely to what the pupils actually
know. In this regard the students’ “thinking”
is interlinked with a matrix of social relation-
ships and concerns.
2 The following paragraphs are based on Arnseth and
Solheim (2002).
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To sum up, the focus of this approach is
not on cognition conceived as psychological
entities located “beneath the skull”, but on
discourse and its sequential organization
grounded in people’s activities and social
practices. We, as analysts, are interested in
how specific formulations are deployed, and
how they are related to the particular context
in which they appear. This context is estab-
lished in activities that are pragmatically or-
ganized. Therefore, instead of considering
cognition, problem solving and remembering
as merely psychological phenomena, they
enter into this model as discursive resources
which teachers and students use to do specif-
ic interactional work. People think together
and engage in collaborative activities by con-
tinuously trying to understand each other’s
motives, understandings and ideas.
Basic concepts of conver-
sation analysis
The techniques of CA and EM enable ana-
lysts to investigate the micro processes of
speech acts in which language is used.
Analysts can study how, for example, claims
to have particular emotions or psychological
states are seen to be socially constituted and
accomplished (Edwards, 1997). For exam-
ple, traditional psychologists assume that ‘re-
membering’ is something which takes place
within the cognitive system of the isolated in-
dividual. By contrast, discourse analysts treat
remembering as a social and collective activ-
ity (Edwards and Potter, 1992). They exam-
ine in detail the speech acts involved in mak-
ing claims about remembering and forget-
ting, and they ask what such claims are ac-
complishing socially (Middleton and Ed-
wards, 1990). Instead of treating remember-
ing as an unobservable, internal process, it
becomes a directly observable, social activity
based upon speech acts. 
One central concept within conversation
analysis is the speaking turn. According to
Harvey Sacks (the founder of CA), it takes
two turns to have a conversation. However,
turn-taking is more than just a defining prop-
erty of conversational activity. The study of
its patterns allows one to describe contextual
variation (examining, for instance, the struc-
tural organisation of turns, how speakers
manage sequences as well as the internal de-
sign of turns). At the same time, the principle
of taking turns in speech can be claimed to be
a universal feature of talk, and it is something
that speakers (normatively) attend to in inter-
action. A second central concept is that of the
adjacency pair. Underneath this concept is
the idea that turns minimally come in pairs
and the first of a pair creates certain expecta-
tions which constrain the possibilities for a
second. Examples of adjacency pairs are
question/answer, complaint/apology, greet-
ing/greeting, accusation/denial, etc. The oc-
currence of adjacency pairs in talk also forms
the basis for the concept of sequential im-
plicativeness: each move in a conversation is
essentially a response to the preceding talk
and an anticipation of the kind of talk which
is to follow. In formulating their present turn,
speakers show their understanding of the pre-
vious turn and reveal their expectations about
the next turn to come. 
Virtues of ethnomethodology
and conversation analysis
Ethnomethodology and conversation analy-
sis represent an alternative3 to the traditional
methodical focus on measurement of learn-
ing output which often reflects a strongly
cognitivist (and in the 60s and 70s also a be-
haviorist) approach to learning and also the
study of the interplay with artifacts and tech-
nology.
3 A survey and overview over EM and CA contributions
to educational research since the 60s is provided by Hester
and Francis (2000, pp. 1-21).
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CA insists on studying in detail the actual
interaction taking place. The study of “talk-
in-interaction” gives a detailed account of the
actual interaction. Taking into consideration
the complex interactional patterns that are
unfolding when a complex technological ar-
tifact is “intervening” in the communication
process, there will clearly be a need for meth-
ods mapping this complex interaction in the
best possible way. The major strength of CA
lies in the idea that conversational meaning is
to be situated in the sequence. Its most pow-
erful idea is undoubtedly that human interac-
tants continually display to each other, in the
course of interaction, their own understand-
ing of what they are doing. 
It seems that EM and CA can be especially
valuable in the study of the role of the tech-
nological artifact as a part of social practices
and a number of interesting studies have
shown that EM and CA may be fruitful in this
field4. These processes are often very com-
plex involving interaction not only between
humans, but also between humans, comput-
ers and the social, organizational and physi-
cal/spatial environment. Through focusing
on actual interaction between, for example,
the educational computer software and the
students, the researcher will be able to trace
not only how the students interact with one
another, but also how they simultaneously in-
teract with the computer. It is certainly very
interesting if CA could be used to describe
this interaction more accurately. 
The traditional ethnographers use their
own participation, either actual or vicarious,
as a basis for building an understanding, and
this is often supplemented by field notes. In
contrast to this, the conversation analyst will
be concerned with how the actor’s account is
established as literal and objective, and what
it is being used to do. This implies a focus on
the detail of interaction: the hesitations, repe-
titions, repairs and emphases. Conversation
analysts have shown just how important
these things are to interaction, and I shall
agree with Jonathan Potter when he says that
“they are virtually impossible for an ethno-
graphic observer without a tape recorder and
high-quality transcript to capture adequate-
ly”. (Potter, 1996, p. 105)
A final virtue of taking a conversation fo-
cus is that the transcribed record of discourse
gives the reader a unique opportunity to eval-
uate the researcher’s interpretations.
Conversation analyst Harvey Sacks had a
goal of producing a form of analysis “where
the reader has as much information as the au-
thor, and can reproduce the analysis” (1992,
vol. I, p. 27). This might be slightly unrealis-
tic, but expresses at least a democratic ap-
proach towards academic research practices.
The virtues and limitations of
conversational turn taking.
An empirical example from
project work in school
As a point of departure for a more systematic
theoretical discussion I will first present and
discuss an empirical example. The following
scene is quite common to many younger stu-
dents trying to use the Internet for education-
al purposes, and it illustrates difficulties with
finding appropriate information on the In-
ternet. Before this particular dialogue oc-
curred, three fourteen-year-old girls had
spent a couple of hours searching the Internet
for material about the situation of women in
Africa. They were supposed to use a video
about women in Burkina Faso to define
themes and problem statements for their pro-
ject work. Before this sequence they had al-
ready defined and formulated their problem
4 Among others, the seminal work of Lucy Suchman
(1987) has been particularly important, especially because
her work also has had strong influence in computer science
and cognitive science. Recent important contributions
which also provide overviews are Heath and Luff (2000)
and Hutchby (2001).
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following lines one can find a classical repair
sequence, an apparent repair-acceptance etc.
And this kind of analysis can be done for the
whole sequence and clearly shows, for exam-
ple, how conversational devices are de-
ployed. From a CA perspective, a fairly sim-
ply structured “turn taking machinery” can
be said to be deployed in this sequence in
which the teacher asks questions and the stu-
dents respond, sometimes with repair se-
quences, sometimes not. I shall argue that
this is analytically valuable and relevant.
Both commonsensically and conversation
analytically, we can identify project work
statements but without discussing or consult-
ing the teacher. According to the guidelines
they are supposed to have some kind of
recognition from the teacher of their choice
of problem statements. 
The class was divided into groups of 3-4
students, and the groups worked in separate
rooms. The teacher rotated between the
groups to see how they were getting on, but
this group did not summon her. The dialogue
starts as the teacher enters the room. This
fragment comprises the first part of the dia-
logue between the teacher and the student
group on the first day of the project work. 
1. Teacher: Have you got any help? (1.0)
2. Monica: We think it is difficult. We cannot find much material. 
3. Anne: The only thing we found was a legal bill concerning polygamy in Uganda, but 
4.  we cannot enter that website.
5. Teacher: But how do you define the problem statements?
6. Monica: How much do African mothers decide over their son’s family.
7 Linda: Or to what extent they have the right to [decide.
8. Cathrine: [How much they decide, that’s it.
9. Teacher: Uh:: there may be something wrong with your problem statements, if you can’t find 
10. any material about it. Because then it is clear that a lot of this is unwritten laws 
11. and rules so that perhaps you may (0.5) may be you should add two or three more 
12. questions.
13. Cathrine: What:: [else ( )
14. Teacher: [What are you saying Cathrine?
15. Cathrine: What else is the video about [than uh
16. Teacher: [It has to do with women’s rights.
17. Anne: We have searched a lot for that. Women’s rights and all that stuff. We’ve got
18. just a lot of crap ( )
19. Teacher: Have you looked for ( ) literature?
20. Cathrine: (..) We have seen a survey or something like that.
21. Teacher: Have you tried to search for ‘Burkina Faso’?
22. Anne: Yes (0.5) No.
23. Linda: We found something about Burkina Faso but it [was like facts about the country 
24. Anne: [perhaps we shall try once more
This piece of interaction can be analyzed
from a number of different angles, but in the
context of this article the basic question is the
relevance of focusing on conversational turn-
taking, sequentiality and talk organization in
the study of educational discourse. I find it
obvious that several CA devices can be suc-
cessfully applied here, for example, how the
conversation begins in line 1 with a teacher’s
announcing question, how two students re-
spond which in turn is followed with a new
question from the teacher, then a response
from a student and a succeeding explanation
from the teacher, then from line 13 and the
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events and interaction around project work
assignments, and we can specify the interac-
tional pattern in detail. We can even analyze
this according to the (not CA, but related)
IRE-format of educational discourse5, that is,
how the discourse is organized according to
the format of I(nitiation), R(esponse) and
E(valuation), and in this sense show how this
interaction can be analyzed in its moment-to-
moment seqentiality as a presumably typical,
normal interaction in a middle school class-
room reproducing an even more typical
asymmetry of teacher-student relations. 
Nevertheless, I would initially question to
what extent this kind of analysis is sufficient
if the research task is to analyze the discourse
from a pedagogical perspective. Focusing on
this task I would be interested in finding out
several things, for example: What is actually
the “pedagogical business” performed here?
What are the participants’ concerns and goals
related to this business? Is there any develop-
ment of meaning making or learning, e,g., in-
stances of ‘appropriation of meaning’6? I will
not discuss this in detail here, just mention
one essential point which in my view clearly
would question some of the fundamental
premises of CA and which at the same time
raises a number of questions of relevance for
research on educational discourse. This point
is related to the analysis of the social interac-
tional patterns between teacher and student
in this project work. A CA based analysis
does not provide us with the appropriate tools
to analyze the nature of this relation because
it is focusing solely on the utterances and the
relation between them, not on the content of
the talk, nor on the flaws, silences or ab-
sences. The repair sequence in line 13-18 is
particularly interesting because, if we apply a
CA approach, we may conclude that this is a
repair sequence in which the students are
made aware of the teacher’s interpretation of
what the video is about (women’s rights).
Seemingly, there is a structurally defined in-
tersubjective consensus on the matter: the
students seem to understand what the teacher
says. However, as educational researchers
we are not primarily interested in the repair
structure of the conversation but, for exam-
ple, in what the students actually say and do
about the teacher’s proposals and advice.
This will tell us something about any actual
intersubjective development between the in-
terlocutors, or in that case we may also po-
tentially talk about an instance of learning or
appropriation of meaning. But a narrow fo-
cus on turn-taking does not provide us with
clues about these processes. Instead, it may
lead us to understand this as a traditional,
asymmetrical teacher-oriented discourse with
a focus on how the teacher deploys conversa-
tional devices in order to bring her messages
home. Here is an excerpt of how the group
dealt with the teacher’s proposal just minutes
after the first session. The teacher has now
left: 
Fragment 2
1. Linda: Search [for Burkina Faso
2.   Monica:            [search for ’Africa’s women’
3.  Anne        [search for Burkina Faso           
(…..)
4. Cathrine: Enter, just push Enter
5. Eva: Ok 
6. Anne: Eva is really desperate (laughs)
7. Cathrine: ‘Latest news from Burkina Faso’. ( )
8. Monica: “Click on this “ ( )
9. Anne: Scroll further down 
10. Cathrine: ‘Women have always’ bla bla bla”
11. Anne: Yes [YES hallo
12. Cathrine:     [’Women in Burkina Faso’”– 
COME ON !
13. Monica: [YES YES WE HAVE GOT INTO 
SOMETHING
This fragment shows that the students did not
follow the teacher’s basic advice which was
to redefine their problem statement. Instead,
5 An updated, extensive discussion of the IRE-format in
educational research can be found in Wells (1999)..
6 Wertsch (1985) introduced this term..
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they immediately tested the teacher’s sugges-
tions for key words for Internet search, and
they also hit upon something they found valu-
able, see line 37-39. Not until we look at this
later sequence can we get any insight into the
actual processes of meaning making in this
project work session. The students show that
they stick to their initial overall strategy and
do not change their problem statement as the
teacher proposes. Now we can also make
more sense of the repair sequence in the first
fragment: it is not about a teacher giving the
students directives of how to understand the
task, but rather a teacher suggesting her own
interpretation of the task. The students’ re-
sponses in the repair sequence are inconclu-
sive about how they assess the teacher’s
ideas, actually any assessment is absent from
the dialogue, except for their comment in line
32 where Anne says that they have searched
for “women’s rights” but without any success.
However, their assessment becomes evident,
although implicitly, in the next fragment
where they show in practice that they do not
follow the teacher’s advice. The turn-taking
organization does not tell us anything about
this. Interestingly, by going beyond the ana-
lytic frame of turn-taking we can also learn a
good deal about the social organization and
power structures involved here. The students
are allowed to decide themselves what to do
with the teacher’s proposal, indicating that in
this project work we do not have the ordinary
asymmetrical power structure between
teacher and student. Without discussing this
in detail here, a clearly relevant research
question would be to analyze the importance
and impact of this seemingly reversed power
structure. But this would certainly go beyond
the perspectives and theoretical commitments
of conversation analysis. 
Basically, this example illustrates a need
for a broader perspective than just looking at
turn-takings and the sequential organization
of utterances in the study of processes of
meaning making and of educational practices.
On the other hand, it also illustrates the need
for a detailed interactional study in order to
grasp the actual meaning making processes.
In order to understand the dynamics of educa-
tional meaning making processes, it may be
fruitful to take a closer look at some funda-
mental concepts and theoretical assumptions
of discourse analysis and conversation analy-
sis. I shall discuss these issues more systemat-
ically focusing on the notions of accountabili-
ty, the concept of knowledgeability and the
concept of turn-taking. 
A critical discussion of




In the following I shall discuss some episte-
mological and methodological issues in the
study of discourse. In doing so, I also present
an outline of the most prominent traditions or
directions in the field of research in discourse
and communication: ethnomethodology, con-
versation analysis, critical discourse analysis
and activity theory. 
I shall concentrate my discussion on three
fundamental7 concepts and premises of CA:
the concept of rationality as accountability,
the premise of the knowledgeable actor, and
the premise of how social action is structured
as sequenced in talk-in-interaction.
Rationality and accountability
It is probably correct as Anthony Giddens re-
marks that the philosophical basis of EM
(and also CA) as “an essentially ethno-
methodological enterprise … remains unelu-
7 The centrality of these concepts are made clear by
many CA theorists, e.g., Sacks (1992), Schegloff (1997),
Hutchby (2001).
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cidated” (Giddens, 1993, p. 58). There is an
allegedly8 strong connection between theory
and method in EM and CA, and both the ad-
vantages and the limitations of this approach
become more evident through a brief recon-
struction and discussion of the basic theoreti-
cal concepts. 
According to Garfinkel there are irrecon-
cilable differences of interest between what
he calls “constructive analysis”, or orthodox
sociology, and EM because the latter is con-
fined to the descriptive study of indexical ex-
pressions in all their empirical variety. This
attitude is proclaimed as one of “ethno-
methodological indifference”. EM and CA is
essentially an anti-Cartesian and Wittgen-
steinian approach where “the activities
whereby members produce and manage set-
tings of organized everyday affairs are iden-
tical with members’ procedures for making
those settings ‘accountable’.” Garfinkel
claims that while “a model of rationality is
necessary in social science for the task of de-
ciding a definition of credible knowledge”,
no such “model” is needed when “coming to
terms with the affairs of everyday life”.
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 270) This, basically,
means that action is to be treated as “rational”
precisely only in so far as it is “accountable”. 
Both Garfinkel, the conversation analysts
and the discursive analysts of the 90s, under-
line the importance of situatedness and in-
dexicality: “Ethnomethodological conversa-
tion analysis suggests that interaction is per-
vasively and inescapably indexical.” (Potter,
1996, p. 24) But, if one is to take this serious-
ly, this must also be the case for the CA itself.
Should not also this analysis be understood
as a situated, local, indexical and particularis-
tic analysis and, therefore, only be of interest
for the actors “doing ethnomethodology”? Is
perhaps CA just another meaning producing
context and one just as strange as the con-
structive sociology which CA so aptly criti-
cizes? I think not, but the lack of reflection on
these matters in many CA studies should be
considered a problem.9 According to CA, an-
alysts should not import their own categories,
theories or claims into participants’ dis-
course. Instead, we should focus on partici-
pant orientations. However, this does not en-
tail that no analytic concepts will be applied.
The CA analyst actually applies concepts like
“adjacency pairs” and “third-turn-repair” in
studying talk and in creating an ordered sense
of what is going on. The epistemological sta-
tus of these concepts is not at all clear. An in-
fluential ethnomethodologist, Michael Lynch,
is clearly aware of these challenges and criti-
cizes CA for it’s scientistic and positivistic
tendencies in its unreflected application of
what he calls the “turn-taking machinery”10
of CA. (Lynch, 1993, p. 233).
The problem of CA’s own reflexivity to-
wards its own contributions is illustrated in
the recent debate between the conversational
analyst Emanuel Schegloff and the discourse
analyst Margaret Wetherell. Schegloff argues
that: 
“[Critical discourse analysis] allows students, in-
vestigators, or external observers to deploy the
terms which preoccupy them in describing, ex-
plaining, critiquing, etc. the events and texts to
which they turn their attention. (…) – there is a
kind of theoretical imperialism involved here, a
kind of hegemony of the intellectuals, of the
literati, of the academics, of the critics whose the-
oretical apparatus gets to stipulate the terms by
reference to which the world is to be understood –
when there has already been a set of terms by ref-
erence to which the world was understood – by
those endogenously involved in its very coming to
pass.” (Schegloff, 1997, p. 167)
8 Allegedly, because I shall argue that you might suc-
cessfully apply CA techniques without subscribing fully to
the theoretical foundations.
9 This is also recognized by some CA theorists: “These
arguments do, indeed, represent a serious problem for CA,
the problem of how to account for its own reflexive contri-
butions to its results”. (Paul ten Have, 1990, p. ). 
10 This term was not Lynch’s own invention, Harvey
Sacks himself introduced the notion of ‘turn-taking ma-
chinery”. 
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Margaret Wetherell responded to the critique
by pointing out that CA practices theoretical
imperialism in its own way.
“(…) for Schegloff, participant orientation seems
to mean only what is relevant for the participants
in this particular conversational moment. Iro-
nically, of course, it is the conversation analyst in
selecting for analysis part of a conversation or
continuing interaction who defines this relevance
for the participants. In restricting the analyst’s
gaze to this fragment, previous conversations,
even previous turns in the same continuing con-
versation, become irrelevant for the analyst but
also, by dictate, for the participants. We don’t
seem to have escaped, therefore, from the imposi-
tion of theorists’ categories and concerns.”
(Wetherell, 1998, p. 403)
It could be argued that although Wetherell is
correct that CA analysts have not managed to
escape from the imposition of theorists’ cate-
gories and “constructive sociology” ap-
proaches, Schegloff is also right in insisting
on the importance of focusing on the per-
spective of the participants, their concerns
and orientations reflected through their talk-
in-interaction. Nevertheless, the idea of the
epistemological primacy of accountability
seems to haunt CA when it tries to explicate
its own premises. There is hardly any doubt
that Schegloff’s “purely technical” analysis
is more than just that: he is applying theoreti-
cal concepts derived from a kind of “con-
structive” and traditional research process
rooted in many years of “doing conversation
analysis.” 
But in my view this cannot be considered a
serious problem in the evaluation of CA as a
research strategy. As the CA analyst Paul ten
Have puts it: 
“Practitioners of CA are less given to philosophi-
cal reflection than to hard work…. The solution
of CA’s basic problems, which stem from the way
it has developed from its basic problematic by
way of a strong empirical commitment, is to be
found in those same practices.” (ten Have, 1990,
p. 27)
This statement is perhaps not assuring from a
purist philosophical or logical point of view,
but in my view this “philosophical indiffer-
ence” cannot be considered an important
problem for CA as a methodological strategy.
These problems would occur if the (construc-
tive!) idea of rationality as accountability is
applied to practical research in an empiricist
way which e.g. excluded obviously impor-
tant, but not easily accountable empirical ma-
terial, e.g. visible gestures, gaze and non-vo-
cal communication. Fortunately, it seems that
many CA-analysts do not exclude these other
forms of communicational modes and some
of the most interesting CA based studies have
focused on non-vocal phenomena (Goodwin,
1981; Heath, 1986).
Although the basic concepts of rationality
in EM and CA may appear unelucidated,
there also are some other concepts which are
considered more important by the CA theo-
rists, and I shall discuss these in the follow-
ing: the premise of the knowledgeable actor
and the premise of the fundamental impor-
tance of analysis of turn-taking and sequen-
tial organization of talk. 
The premise of the knowledgeable actor
Conversation analysts, as well as ethno-
methodologists, frequently claim that one of
the strengths of their approach is that they fo-
cus on “how participants themselves produce
and interpret each other’s actions” (Pome-
rantz, 1984, pp. 360-1). Conversation ana-
lysts do not seek to explain interaction in
terms of sociological structures, which lie
‘behind the backs of the participants’ (Heri-
tage, 1984; Boden, 1994). Instead, they ob-
serve how participants make sense of, and
account for, the social world. In this respect,
CA assumes that “human beings are knowl-
edgeable agents in the production (and repro-
duction) of their lives and their history”
(Boden, 1994, p. 13). This assumption of
knowledgeability forms the core of the eth-
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nomethodological enterprise: “By giving
back to social agents their knowledgeability
of their own social actions, it was then possi-
ble to sit back and observe the structuring
quality of the world as it happens” (ibid., p.
74). 
As I have underlined in this paper, an ex-
tremely valuable virtue of CA is that analysts
are bidden to take seriously what people ac-
tually say and do, rather than assume that ac-
tors are simply re-enacting given roles within
a hypothetical social structure. On the other
hand, the assumption of the actor’s transpar-
ent knowledgeability may also cause analytic
problems if understood in an empiricist way.
As Sfard and Kieran show in a recent study
of students’ talk while working with mathe-
matics (2001, p. 63), studying talk-in-inter-
action may be a deceptive endeavor. A stu-
dent does reasonably well on final tests, but
this result is contrary to what can be expected
from the detailed analysis of the boy’s mathe-
matical activities in the daily class room. The
videotaped analysis of the boy’s daily mathe-
matics lessons shows hardly any sign of
mathematical reasoning from this boy, ac-
cording to the researcher’s well documented
report. What becomes clear is that the stu-
dent’s achievement in the institutional setting
seems to reflect that the students find school
mathematics uninteresting and/or boring.
What he has learned, he has probably learned
from his father outside school, in the
evenings or weekends. 
Obviously, as also my initial example
shows, one cannot get a good impression of
the students’ knowledgeability or lack of the
same by only studying the organization and
sequentiality of their talk. This clearly calls
for a broadening of the CA framework in the
direction of the critical discourse analysis ap-
proach. 
It is important for the analyst to look for
instances of not only lack of knowledge, but
also how repression of knowledgeability
might be accomplished. It could be argued
that it is possible to use the (albeit broadened)
framework of CA in order to analyze such
questions without applying more traditional
speculative interpretations and “grand theo-
rizing” of what “might have happened” with-
out any analysis of the actual discourse.
Billig (1997) shows how such mechanisms
as repression and absences can be observed
and traced back to actual talk in interaction,
but only if we abandon the analytic frame-
work of conversational turn-taking. 
The turn-taking as the focus of social
action research
Traditional CA’s problem with how to cope
with unspoken communication and its mean-
ing is illustrated even more vividly when
looking more closely at another basic feature
of CA, turn-taking and the sequenced struc-
turing of action. The observable speaking
turn constitutes the basic unit of analysis. It
may seem that CA here demonstrates some
almost empiricist ideas.11 Several ethno-
methodologists have criticized CA in this
point (see e.g. Lynch, 1993). 
According to Boden, “turn-taking and the
sequenced structuring of action” lie “at the
heart” of social interaction ((1994, p. 63).
The organizational pattern is presumed to be
discoverable through understanding the se-
quential constraints on speakers. Drew
claims that ‘turns’ in conversation are treated
“as the product of the sequential organization
of talk” (1995, p. 70). The organization is
presumed to be present in the accounts which
11 Pierre Bourdieu (1992) also underlines EM and CA’s
problem of reflexivity about its own project: “In their
struggle against the statistical positivism they (i,e. the eth-
nomethodologists) seem to accept some of the prerequi-
sites of their opponents. Facts against facts, video record-
ings against statistics….Those who are satisfied with do-
ing recordings do not ask about the problems of
editing/cutting, and accept what has been constructed in
advance, and this does not necessarily comprise the princi-
ples of their own interpretation.” (my translation, I.S) 
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speakers themselves give. Thus, the analyst
seeks to note conversational devices, which
“are demonstrably or observably relevant to
the participants themselves” (ibid., p. 76; em-
phasis in the original). By so doing, analysts
hope to discover the “stable and organized
properties of conversational structures”
(ibid., p. 76). 
I think that silence can be studied by ap-
plying ethnomethodological methods. But
more traditional, so-called “canonical CA”12
seems unable to do that in a satisfactory way.
The well-known ethnomethodologist Jeff
Coulter uses this example in a discussion on
the email list EthnoOnline in 2000:
A: What are you hiding for me?
B: Nothing
Coulter points out that these utterances may
be analyzed in terms of the adjacency pair
‘question-answer’ , but this would miss the
point in the talk that what was “being done in
the talk, by the talk, was the making of an ac-
cusation and the rebuttal, the denial, of that
accusation.” (Coulter, unpubl., cited in Crab-
tree, 2000)
The central focus on turn-takings as
“atoms” in the CA framework raises several
problems of a methodological character
which are directly relevant to my initial prob-
lem of how to account for absences and un-
spoken utterances.
First, the focus on the coherent and stable
organization of conversational structures ac-
tually excludes absences. The analyst’s inter-
est is directed towards the observable utter-
ances and how these are structured in a co-
herent manner. As Michael Billig formulates
it: 
“What was, and what will be spoken, provide the
means for understanding the function and mean-
ing of what is said. In this respect, the analysts put
themselves in the same position as the partici-
pants. What this means is that analysts search for
the connections between utterances which are
present in the conversation. What is absent from
the conversation tends to be absent from the
analysis.” (Billig, 1997, p. 147) 
Second, a presumption of the actor’s knowl-
edgeability in turn-takings and focus on the
presence of the utterances may lead to seri-
ous flaws in the interpretation of the actual
communication. As Derek Edwards demon-
strates in a case study from a conversation in
a classroom, the participants’ “meaning” in a
sequence of dialogue may be misunderstood
unless a broader argumentative context is
taken into consideration. (Edwards, 1993)
What some pupils say in one sequence
should be understood in the context of previ-
ous discourses. This is actually no argument
against the application of CA because a de-
tailed account of the communication is nec-
essary in order to depict the actual misunder-
standings. But it is an argument for the im-
portance of a broader unit of analysis than the
individual sets of speaking turns. 
Third, the focus on speaking turns and se-
quential organization is also said (e.g. by pro-
ponents of activity theory, see for example
Nardi, 1996) to imply that analysis of more
persistent social structures that span speaking
turns (or sequences of these) are not relevant
units of analysis for traditional CA and,
therefore, illustrate the limited value of CA.
To some extent this may be a relevant cri-
tique for some CA studies, but one could also
argue that CA inspired analysis may be very
valuable and perhaps a necessary tool in se-
curing that an understanding of these “struc-
tures” is built on empirical analysis of the ac-
tual interaction, situated in the practices of
the people concerned. 
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12 A term frequently used in the discussion on the Ethno
Hotline in 2000, also by CA analysts like Paul ten Have.
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Activity theory – an alterna-
tive to conversation analysis?
In a recent paper (Engeström, 1999), a lead-
ing proponent of activity theory, intervenes
in the discussion between Schegloff and
Wetherell and presents activity theory as a
“third alternative” between more traditional
CA and the broader (often Foucauldian) criti-
cal discourse analysis. The paper is interest-
ing not primarily because, in my view, it sub-
stantiates some of my own critical evaluation
of CA, but because the alternative proposed
illustrates some of the problems of more tra-
ditional, abstract theorizing in the social sci-
ences that Schegloff and others have criti-
cized. 
Inspired by Soviet psychologists (Vygot-
sky and Leont’ev, in particular) and ideas
from (Marxist) dialectical materialism, activ-
ity theory argues that what organizes social
life into meaningful units is practical object-
oriented activity, which may also be called
productive activity, understood in a broad
sense (Leont’ev, 1978; Cole, 1996). As
Engeström formulates this: “Practical activi-
ties have this strong organizing potential due
to their objects. Objects should not be con-
fused with goals. Goals are primarily con-
scious, relatively short-lived and finite aims
of individual actions. The object is an endur-
ing, constantly reproduced purpose of a col-
lective activity system that motivates and de-
fines the horizon of possible goals and ac-
tions.” (Engeström, 1999, p. 4).
In Leont’ev’s (1981) account, activity sys-
tems arise with the division of labor. He uses
the example of a tribal hunt. When the object
of the hunt is sufficiently demanding, mem-
bers of the tribe divide the labor: some chase
the game away, while others wait in ambush
and kill it. Taken in isolation, the action of
chasing away the game makes no sense. Seen
against the background of the collective ac-
tivity system and its division of labor, the ac-
tion is perfectly sensible. (Engeström, 1999) 
In the following I will briefly discuss some
specific issues concerning activity theory’s
(in Engeström’s interpretation in the article)
potential as an alternative methodological
approach to EM and CA. I do not attempt to
present an overall evaluation of activity theo-
ry, but focus on issues directly relevant to the
discussion in this paper.
First, for activity theory, the basic unit of
analysis is “the situated activity system”
which is considered to be the reasonable mid-
dle ground between the “artificially isolated
fragment of discourse and the global argu-
mentative social fabric.” (Engeström, 1999,
p. 6) Activity theory is, therefore, under-
standably critical towards what is called the
“insistence on discourse as a privileged and
more or less self-sufficient modality of social
conduct and interaction. This insistence is
largely taken for granted and shared by both
conversation analysts and critical discourse
analysts”. (Engeström, 1999) It is argued that
“organizations are not reducible to small
fragments of discourse; they carry histories
and operate as meeting grounds of multiple
argumentative threads.” In line with my pre-
vious discussion concerning CA, I agree that
this critique seems relevant for several CA
inspired studies. I would argue that it seems
to be a sound methodological strategy to start
with the most accessible aspects of what is
done in conversations, the speaking of
words, and pursue the analysis of less easily
isolatable ones later when one has learned
more about the whole organization through
the first. Thus starting with the verbal aspects
is not a principled choice, but a practical one.
As mentioned already, a growing collection
of CA studies of non-vocal phenomena
shows that these may very well be included
in the CA framework. 
Second, activity theory argues for not only
asking retrospectively why an action or an ut-
terance occurred, but also for asking, “What
dynamics and possibilities of change and de-
velopment are involved in the action?” In ap-
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plying theoretical tools13 developed in this
tradition, activity theory wants to present a
supplementary perspective in focusing on the
conditions and the development of more per-
sistent social structures and not only focusing
on the micro-sociological objects of speaking
turns. It could be argued that it would also be
possible to integrate this focus on conditions
for change in a broader discourse analytic
framework, albeit not without underlining
that such “conditions for change” should be
observable or at least traceable in the actual
discourse. 
Third, an important virtue of activity theo-
ry and its broader perspective on social ac-
tion is the insistence on analyzing action re-
lated to physical and mental activities, in-
cluding the use of artifacts and technologies
as tools. According to this perspective, differ-
ent kinds of tools, of intellectual/linguistic as
well as physical tools, are seen as mediators
between the actor and the world. When
studying the use of computers in classrooms,
the focus will be on analyzing these artifacts
as parts of social practices, not as isolated
technologies per se. This is a view which is
underlined by activity theorists and which
constitutes one of the most important differ-
ences to the more traditional cognitivist view
of thinking and rationality. (Säljö, 2000) 
Fourth, Engeström argues for the impor-
tance of “intermediate theoretical tools be-
tween the specific data and the general model
of an activity system.” (Engeström, 1999, p.
10) This differs from the EM/CA perspec-
tive. Because EM and CA rejects the whole
idea of a “general model”, there is no need
for intermediating tools; it is just another
form of “theoretical imperialism” which
means to “turn lived experiences and embod-
ied practices into general lexicons and asso-
ciated models.” (Suchman, 2000, p. 13). 
Engeström argues for the application of
specific, conceptual, intermediate tools de-
rived from activity theory research. If CA
may sometimes be “abstract empiricist”, a
problem with some of Engeström’s concepts
and complex models of activity systems
seems to be that they tend to be what Richard
Merton (1957) called “grand theorizing” An
example is the concept “contradiction”
which is introduced by Engeström as an in-
termediate theoretical tools. Contradiction is
described as “the idea of contradictions as the
driving force of change and development in
human organizations”. (Engeström, 1999, p.
12) It is also said that “a contradiction is a
historically accumulated dynamic tension
between opposing forces in an activity sys-
tem.” (ibid., p. 10)14 This seems to be quite
close to what Karl Popper (1986) called “his-
toricist” explanations in his critique of
Marxist-inspired ideas of “objective laws of
dialectics” and so-called inevitable “laws of
history”. It is not so well-known that this
seems also to be exactly the kind of abstract
Marxism that Lev Vygotsky once warned
against: 
“The direct application of the theory of dialectical
materialism to the problems of natural science and
in particular to the group of biological sciences or
psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible
to apply it directly to history and sociology. In
Russia it is thought that the problem of “psycholo-
gy and Marxism” can be reduced to creating a
psychology which is up to Marxism, but in reality
13 A key concept is “the zone of proximal development”
which may be understood as “spaces for potential radical
transformation, achievable through resolving and tran-
scending its contradictions” (Vygotsky, 1978).
14 This interpretation of the universality of “contradic-
tion” stems from Friedrich Engels’conceptualization in his
infamous “dialectical laws”. According to Engels and the
tradition of dialectical materialism, “contradictions” are
universal law-like mechanisms, not intermediate concepts
between “laws” and “descriptions” (or between “social
structures’’ and “discourse”.) Arguably, this way of apply-
ing Hegelian concepts was not central in Marx’ own writ-
ings; it is also clear that Marx occasionally warned against
it (Elster, 1985, p. 43). 
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it is far more complex. Like history, sociology is
in need of the intermediate special theory of his-
torical materialism which explains the concrete
meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of
the abstract laws of dialectical materialism. (…..)
Dialectical materialism is a most abstract science.
The direct application of dialectical materialism to
the biological sciences and psychology, as is com-
mon nowadays, does not go beyond the formal
logical, scholastic, verbal subsumption of particu-
lar phenomena, whose internal sense and relation
is unknown, under general, abstract, universal cat-
egories. At best this leads to an accumulation of
examples and illustrations.” (Vygotsky, 1997, em-
phasis in the original)
Moreover, any more clear or detailed defini-
tion or operationalization is not presented in
Engeström’s line of reasoning. The concept
of “contradiction” is actually not used in the
analysis as an intermediate tool (as Vygotsky
recommends in his defense of “intermediate
special theory of historical materialism
which explains the concrete meaning…”),
but only as a tentative hypothesis of what the
basic forces behind the actual interaction are,
actually expressing – in philosophical terms
– a clearly realist (or essentialist) approach
devoted to “find out about the hidden work-
ings of social existence.” (Smith, 1998, p
319) An ethnomethodologist would say (and
I would agree) that this means to construct
theories “behind the back of the partici-
pants.” One problem with this conceptualiza-
tion of “contradiction” is that it seems to
come close to what Merton (1957) called
“post factum interpretations” which are fre-
quently so flexible, vague, or open that they
can “account” for almost any data. More im-
portantly, instead of mediating between “dis-
course” and “social structure” and contribute
to a better understanding of situated prac-
tices, (for example in a classroom) this kind
of abstract conceptualization may actually be
a hindrance in the research process and lead
to an unfortunate focus on “objective”, hypo-
thetical, unobservable, but law-like mecha-
nisms, operating “behind the back” of the ac-
tors. Recent evaluations of activity theory in-
dicate that activity theory may seem attrac-
tive to many because it provides a general
framework for the understanding of socio-
cultural activities, but that it fails to offer sig-
nificant insights into “the fine-grained as-
pects of interaction between individuals
within this setting.” (Issroff and Scanlon,
2001) A possible explanation for this may be
the very focus in recent activity theory on es-
tablishing general, “multi-level” models and
historicist explanations15 at the expense of
the more local, emerging, detailed moment-
to-moment analysis recommended by eth-
nomethodology and different kinds of dis-
course analysts.
Conclusion and some metho-
dological consequences
The conclusion must be that in the study of
situated educational activities we must avoid
not only the empiricist pitfalls of what I have
called “canonical CA”, but also the histori-
cist abstractions of more traditional social
theory in its invoking of different kinds of
“grand theorizing” categorizations. There is
no such thing as a “pure reality” which may
be objectively observed and depicted by the
analyst. Of course, the CA analyst is not only
doing “technical analysis”. As Wetherell and
others have argued, the analyst cannot escape
from the fact that he will always apply some
kind of categories or theoretical presupposi-
tions in the analysis. The crucial question
then becomes what kind of theories and cate-
15 Activity theory often recommends this kind of reason-
ing invoking “socio-historical dimensions”, for example in
the application of the abstract notion of “division of
labour” as a central explanatory idea even in analysis of ed-
ucational discourse in classrooms (see e.g. Wertsch, 1985;
Engestrom, 1995). I think this is a blind alley. Appeals to
institutional structures like division of labour simply can-
not explain the mechanisms of meaning making and appro-
priation of meaning, or the important processes of decon-
textualization of concepts.
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gories, and on what level of abstraction, may
be appropriate in the study of educational
talk and meaning making processes, which is
our case here. I shall discuss this very briefly
by underscoring a couple of points. First, in
the discussion of some texts by activity theo-
rists I have already argued against the ideas
of invoking general philosophical or histori-
cist categories like “the law of contradiction”
or “division of labor” in the study of educa-
tional meaning making. I have argued that
you simply cannot understand, for example,
the processes of educational decontextualiza-
tion and conceptualization on the basis of an
analysis of how labor is socially distributed.
(Williams, 1998)
Secondly, in line with the ethnomethod-
ologically inspired critique of CA, I would
argue that it is important for further research
to address what Harold Garfinkel has called
the problem of the “the missing whatness” in
the traditional social sciences. It seems to be
a fundamental problem with the “turn taking
machinery” of CA that it also often, in its
own peculiar way, tends to study social inter-
action as formalizable patterns of the sequen-
tial organization of talk instead of displaying
the participants’ own categories and orienta-
tions. Paying attention to the “missing what-
ness” requires a methodological strategy that
is much closer to how, for example, educa-
tional work is produced and made recogniz-
able as the work that it is for participants.
This is illustrated by the empirical examples
in this article which underscore the need for
detailed analysis not only or primarily of
conversational turn taking but of the actual,
pedagogical business performed. I think
Garfinkel’s “unique adequacy requirement
principle” is particularly relevant here:
“In its weak use the unique adequacy require-
ment of methods is identical with the requirement
of methods for the analyst to recognize, or identi-
fy, or follow the development of, or describe phe-
nomenon of order in local production of coherent
detail. The analyst must be vulgarly competent in
the local production and reflexively natural ac-
countability of the phenomenon of order he is
‘studying’”. (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992, p. 197)
This means that the analyst should focus on
displaying the participants‘ competence and
actions in their everyday activities as well as
their lack of knowledge or how knowledge-
ability may be repressed. The analyst must
also understand the activities he/she is study-
ing. In the study of project work in schools, it
should be required that the analyst under-
stands the fundamental ideas, practices,
methods and implementations of this kind of
pedagogical activities. Of course, this means
studying the actual interaction very closely,
but it also means that the analyst knows what
may be relevant about the tasks and the
broader social and educational context of the
activity. It follows from this that no special
methodological apparatus is required or de-
fined a priori: the actual methods must be de-
veloped and adjusted in accordance with the
unique adequacy requirement principle.
Analysts should also elucidate their own the-
oretical, analytical points of departure. The
categories and theories should be developed
inductively, grounded in the social interac-
tion of the participants and their activities;
not only their defined goals, tasks and knowl-
edge, but also their silences, absences and
how their knowledgeability may be re-
pressed. 
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